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The foundation of economic theory is based on the premise that prices will converge to their equilibrium value. 
However, prior research has documented that stock prices cluster on round pricing increments. In this study, 
we develop and test the hypothesis that audit quality and the management of earnings—both of which affects 
the information environment of the firm—influence the degree of price clustering. Results show that firms 
with Big 4 auditors have less clustering in their stock prices while firms with higher abnormal audit fees, more 
discretionary accruals, and firms that tend to manipulate earnings have a higher degree of price clustering. 
These findings support our hypothesis and suggest that accounting information quality helps explain the price 
clustering anomaly and subsequently influences the efficiency of financial markets. 
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Economic theory is based, in part, on the idea that prices will converge towards their equilibrium value. 
However, prices in various financial markets are not uniformly distributed across all pricing increments. 
Instead, stocks tend to cluster on round prices. First documented in the 1960s, research has shown 
that both commodity and stock prices are more likely to occur at whole dollars than at half dollars and 
more likely to occur at half dollars than at quarters (Wyckoff, 1963; Niederhoffer and Osborne 1966). 
Even in more modern financial markets, research continues to show that prices tend to cluster on 
round numbers (Ball, Torous, and Tschoegl, 1985; Harris, 1991; Ap Gwilym, Clare, and Thomas, 1998; 
Hameed and Terry, 1998; Bessembinder, 1999; Sopranzetti and Datar, 2002; Ahn, Cai, and Cheung, 
2005; Ni, Pearson, and Poteshman, 2005; Ohta, 2006; Sonnemans, 2006; Alexander and Peterson, 
2007; Ikenberry and Weston, 2008; Blau, Van Ness, and Van Ness, 2012; Blau and Griffith, 2016). The 
implications of such clustering are broad. Seminal research by Hayek (1945) and Friedman (1977) 
contend that in general, prices play an important role as an information mechanism. Said differently, 
equilibrium prices reveal information to other market participants. When stock prices are not 
uniformly distributed across all increments and instead cluster on round prices, the presence of 
clustering begins to question how informative stock prices really are. The presence of price clustering 
in financial markets might inhibit the efficiency of financial markets (Malkiel and Fama, 1970), which is 
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a central tenet of asset pricing theory. Therefore, identifying factors that contribute to the presence 
of price clustering becomes important. 
Two explanations for the presence of price clustering seem to have the most merit. First, as 
discussed in Wyckoff (1963) and Niederhoffer and Osborne (1966), the presence of price clustering is 
possibly explained by a simple behavioral preference for round numbers. Humans think in round 
numbers and therefore trade in round numbers. Individual preferences for round numbers are well 
documented even outside of the scope of financial markets. For instance, Pope and Simonsohn (2011) 
show that professional baseball players adjust their traditional behavior in order to finish the season 
batting above rather than below .300. Similarly, Pope and Simonsohn (2011) also find that high school 
students are more likely to retake the SAT exam after scoring just below a round number. In the 
context of price clustering, the behavioral preferences for round numbers suggest that investors and 
traders are more likely to submit limit orders on round prices than on non-round prices, which might 
result in a greater degree of price clustering. Harris (1991) presents a second explanation, arguing that 
the presence of price clustering is consistent with the idea that negotiating equilibrium prices is costly 
for investors. Therefore, market participants tend to settle on round prices in order to avoid additional 
negotiations costs, which might be associated with additional time needed for further negotiations or 
costs of information acquisition. Harris (1991) shows that price clustering is greater for smaller-cap 
stocks and stocks that are more volatile—a subset of stocks in which information acquisition costs are 
likely to be higher. It is important to note that the two explanations are not mutually exclusive. That 
is, the tendency to settle on round prices to avoid further negotiation costs might still be consistent 
with behavioral preferences for round prices.  
Given the observed level of and explanations for price clustering, this study develops and tests the 
hypothesis that more reliable accounting information – or accounting information of higher quality – 
reduces the level of price clustering in financial markets. In particular, we posit that audit quality 
reduces the level of price clustering while earnings management and earnings manipulation increase 
price clustering. Our hypothesis is motivated by the intuitive idea that when accounting information is 
of higher quality at the firm level, the information acquisition costs (Harris, 1991) and the uncertainty 
about the true value of stocks (Bradley, Cooney, Jordan and Singh, 2004) are lower. To the extent that 
this is true, traders and investors will face lower negotiation costs and stock prices will cluster less on 
round-pricing increments. We conduct a series of multivariate tests and find that firms with Big 4 
auditors have lower levels of stock price clustering. In economic terms, our tests show that relative to 
non-Big 4 firms, firms with Big 4 auditors have price clustering that is 1% lower. Additional robustness 
tests show that changes from Big 4 auditors are also associated with an increase in price clustering. 
We find that the absolute value of abnormal audit fees, positive abnormal audit fees, and negative 
abnormal audit fees are associated with more price clustering.1 In additional tests, we find that 
discretionary accruals are directly related to the degree of price clustering. In economic terms, a one 
standard deviation increase in discretionary accruals is associated with a 76-basis point increase in 
price clustering. Likewise, a one standard deviation increases in the firm’s Beneish (1999) M-Score, 
which measures the degree of earnings manipulation, is associated with a 35-basis point increase in 
price clustering. These findings tend to support our hypothesis and speak to the importance of high-
quality accounting information on stock prices. Our results also indirectly support the findings in Chiao 
and Wang (2009) who show that trading by the most informed investors leads to a reduction in the 
level of price clustering, thus highlighting the important link between information acquisition and price 
clustering. Indeed, our findings contribute to the broad literature that examines how higher-quality 
accounting information can influence the overall efficiency of financial markets (Dopuch and Simunic,




1982; Dodd, Dopuch, Hothausen, and Leftwich, 1984; Loudder, Khurana, Sawyers, Cordery, Johnson, 
Lowe, and Wunderle, 1992; Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995; Subramanyam, 1996; Weber and 
Willenborg, 2003; Francis, 2004; Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, and Tuna, 2005; Gul, Kim, and Qiu, 2010; 
Iliev, 2010; among others). In addition, our findings fit nicely into the literature that discusses potential 
explanations for why price clustering occurs (Ball et al. 1985; Harris, 1991).  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background and a discussion of 
relevant literature. Section 3 describes the data used throughout the analysis. Section 4 presents the 




In this section, we provide a more detailed discussion of the related literature. As mentioned 
previously, this study tests the hypothesis that higher-quality accounting information will lead to less 
price clustering in financial markets. Throughout the study, we use two categories of accounting 




To determine the quality of auditors, we follow a broad literature and classify firms into those with Big 
4 auditors and those with non-Big 4 auditors. Dopuch and Simunic (1980) find that larger audit firms 
provide higher-quality services to maintain their reputational capital. Likewise, DeAngelo (1981) and 
Francis and Wilson (1988) discuss how auditor size could proxy for auditor quality. Empirically, 
Palmrose (1988) and Becker, DeFond, Jimbalvo, and Subramanyam (1998) show that firms with the 
largest external auditors have lower litigation rates and fewer instances of earnings management. 
Behn, Choi, and Kang (2008) and Lawrence, Minutti-Meza, and Zhang (2011) also provide evidence that 
the Big 4 (or Big 5) audit firms provide higher-quality audit services than non-Big 4 (or Big 5) audit firms. 
Therefore, in our subsequent tests, we examine the association between price clustering in financial 
markets and whether a particular firm uses a Big 4 audit firm. Additionally, we examine how price 
clustering varies in years when firms change from a Big 4 auditor to a non-Big 4 auditor and visa-versa. 
In addition to using the Big 4 audit firm classification, we also examine the association between 
price clustering and abnormal audit fees. Abnormal audit fee is computed by estimating the residuals 
from the audit fee determination model. A growing debate in the literature attempts to determine 
how abnormal audit fees reflect audit quality. On one hand, higher audit fees can represent greater 
audit efforts, and thus, a higher-quality audit (the effort view). In support of this view, Eshleman and 
Guo (2014) show that abnormal audit fees is positively related to audit quality. Similarly, Blankley, 
Hurtt, and MacGregor (2012) find that high abnormal audit fees is associated with less likelihood of 
earnings restatements. Higgs and Skantz (2006) use earnings response coefficients to measure 
perceived audit quality and find similar results. On the other hand, higher audit fees can also be viewed 
as bribes or economic rents being earned by the auditor (Kinney and Libby 2002). Academic literature 
refers to this view as the “economic bonding view”. In support of this view, Choi, Kim, and Zhang 
(2010) find that abnormal (positive) audit fees are negatively associated with audit quality. Similarly, 
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2 Ln(AUDIT FEEit) = b0+b1LNASSETit + b2LOSSit + b3ROAit + b4LEVERAGEit + b5INVRECit + 
b6FOROPSit+b7EMPLOYEES_SQROOTit+b8NSEGMENTSit+b9NEWFINit+b10EXTDISTit +b11GCOit+ b12ICWEAKit +b13BUSYit + 
b14DELAYit + b15AFILERit + b16BIG4it +YEAR FIXED EFFECTS +INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS + εit  
Where: LNASSET is the natural logarithm of total assets; LOSS take the value if the company reports negative net income, and 
0 otherwise; ROA is auditee return on asset; LEVERAGE is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets; INVREC is the sum of 
auditee inventory and receivables scaled by auditee total assets; FOROPS takes the value 1 if the auditee reports a foreign 
currency translation adjustment, 0 otherwise; EMPLOYEE_SQROOT is the square root of the number of auditee employees 
(measured in thousands); NSEGMENTS is the number of business segments; NEWFIN takes the value 1 if the sum of new equity 
and debt issue exceeds $50,000 and 0 otherwise; EXTDIST takes the value 1 if the absolute value of extraordinary items or 
discontinued operation exceeds $10,000 and 0 otherwise. GCO takes the value 1 if the auditor opinion for the fiscal year 
includes a going concern opinion and 0 otherwise; ICWEAK takes the value 1 if the auditor reports an internal control 
weakness and 0 otherwise. BUSY takes the value 1 if the auditee fiscal year ends in December and 0 otherwise; DELAY is the 
number of calendar days elapsed between the auditee’s fiscal year-end and the date of the audit opinion; AFILER takes the 
value 1 if the auditee market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year exceeds $75 million and 0 otherwise; and BIG4 takes 
the value 1 if the auditee hires one of the BIG 4 auditors and 0 otherwise.  
3 The indices include the Days’ Sales in Receivables Index, the Gross Margin Index, the Asset Quality Index, the Sales Growth 
Index, the Depreciation Index, the Sales, General, and Administrative Expenses Index, the Leverage Index, and the Total 
Accruals to Total Assets index. The M-Score is the weighted (linear) combination of these variables obtained from point 
estimates from a regression analysis described in Beneish (1999).   
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follow Doogar, Sivadasan, and Solomon (2015) to construct the audit fee determination model.2 The 
residual of the model captures the fee variation within auditor-type. We use absolute values of the fee 
residual to measure the extent of fee variation. In addition, we separate the positive and negative fee 
residuals, as such positive and negative fee residuals contain different elements of auditor rents 
(Defond, Raghunandan, Subramanyam 2002; Hope and Langli 2010; Larcker and Richardson 2004; Choi 
et al. 2010; Asthana and Boone 2012). According to Asthana and Boone (2012), positive fee residuals 
indicate an above expected fee, resulting in potential compromised auditor independence while 
negative fee residuals capture the client’s strong bargaining power over an auditor, resulting in a 
negative impact on the auditor’s independence and auditing quality. We are careful to note, however, 
the results in Choi et al. (2010) who do not find a meaningful relationship between negative abnormal 
audit fees and audit quality. Despite the lack of consensus, when focusing on the absolute fee 
residuals, both positive and negative, the absolute value of abnormal audit fees might be directly 
associated with greater price clustering. Indirectly, our tests using the absolute value of abnormal 
audit fees might contribute to the debate about how abnormal audit fees reflect auditor quality. As 
with our Big 4 audit firm tests, we also examine changes in abnormal audit fees for additional 
robustness. 
 
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AND MANIPULATION 
 
For the second category of accounting information quality, we examine the relation between price 
clustering and the propensity of firms to manage and possibly manipulate their earnings. 
Subramanyam (1996) finds that discretionary accruals affect stocks prices and argues that accruals 
reflect the management of earnings. Dechow et al. (1995), Becker et al. (1998), Rangan (1998), and 
Cohen and Zarowin (2010) among others, make similar arguments. To the extent that discretionary 
accruals represent earnings management, and that earnings management lowers the quality of 
accounting information, our hypothesis predicts that firm-level discretionary accruals will directly 
affect the degree of price clustering. 
Our final measure of accounting information quality is the Beneish M-Score. Like the Altman Z-Score 
that measures bankruptcy risk, the M-Score is used to proxy for earnings manipulation and is obtained 
using a combination of eight different indices.3 A large  number of studies have used the M-Score as a 




measure of possible earnings manipulation (Teoh, Wong, and Rao, 1998; Jones, Krishnan, and 
Melendrez, 2008; Price, Sharp, and Wood, 2011; Beneish, Lee, and Nichols, 2013; DeFond, Lim, and 
Zang, 2015). In the framework of our hypothesis, the potential manipulation of earnings will harm 
accounting quality and lead to an increase in price clustering. 
 
HOW HIGH-QUALITY ACCOUNTING INFORMATION INFLUENCE PRICE CLUSTERING 
 
Given the discussion of our various proxies for accounting information quality, this subsection 
describes in more detail, how the lack of high-quality, reliable accounting information can influence 
the degree of price clustering. As previously mentioned, our hypothesis is intuitive and is based on the 
idea that stocks tend to cluster on round prices because of individual preferences for round numbers. 
These preferences result from traders’ and investors’ awareness that negotiating finer prices is costly 
(either in terms of additional time and/or information acquisition costs) and in order to avoid such 
costs, market participants tend to settle on round pricing increments (Harris, 1991). As mentioned 
above, results in Pope and Simonsohn (2011) suggest that preferences for round numbers will extend 
far beyond traders, investors, and other financial market participants. In addition, stock price 
clustering can also be associated with valuation uncertainty. For example, Bradley et al. (2004) find 
that IPOs with integer offer prices have higher first-day returns than those priced on dollar fractions. 
They argue that clustering at integers is a function of valuation uncertainty by the underwriter. When 
there is greater uncertainty about a firm’s value, a greater probability that the offer price will be set at 
an integer to compensate the underwriter for assuming the additional risk. We argue that negotiation 
costs, which are a function of time and costs associated with the acquisition of information, are also a 
function of the risks associated with valuation uncertainty. When traditional accounting information 
is of lower quality, information acquisition becomes more costly and valuation risk becomes high. This 
idea is laid out nicely in a research stream that has shown low-quality accounting information 
generates uncertainty and opacity among market participants. Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper 
(2005) report that, due to uncertainty and opacity, poor accounting quality results in higher costs for 
firms. Similar results are found in Levitt (1998) and Foster (2003). The uncertainty generated by poor 
accounting information is likely to increase the information acquisition costs and valuation risks faced 
by investors – thus leading to a greater tendency for stock prices to cluster on round increments. As 
additional motivation for our tests, Chiao and Wang (2009) find that the trading of institutional 
investors – those who have been shown to be informed traders – reduce the level of price clustering. 
In the framework of our study, if the information environment of the firm is improved, then informed 
trading is likely to adversely affect the degree of price clustering. Determining whether poor 
accounting information explains the anomalous degree of price clustering becomes an empirical 




To test our research question, we collect stock market data from the Center for Research on Security 
Prices (CRSP) and obtain financial statement data from COMPUSTAT. After receiving the daily prices, 
returns, trading volume, and other information from the CRSP, we compute a number of different 
variables to be used throughout the study. CLUSTER% represents the total number of cluster days 
divided by the total number of traded days of the stock in that year, in which cluster days is the total 
number of days the daily closing stock prices clustered on a $0.05 increment (Harris, 1991). PRICE 
represents the closing price of each stock at the end of each day.  We follow Blau and Griffith (2016), 
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4 The Amihud illiquidity ratio is the ratio of the absolute value of the daily stock return to its dollar volume and scaled up by 
1,000,000.  
5 The big four audit firms are Deloitte, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & Young and KPMG  
6 Modified Jones model: The discretionary accrual is the difference between total accrual and the non-discretionary portion 
of the accruals. Total accruals are calculated as the change in total current assets, less the change in total current liabilities, 
less the change in cash, less the change in debt in the current liabilities, less the depreciation and amortization, and then 
scaled by the total assets of previous period. The non-discretionary accruals portion is the sum of three components—i.e., 
the inverse of last period total assets, change of revenue minus the change of receivable scaled by last period total assets 
and gross property plant and equipment scaled by last period total assets. The method to extract the discretionary portion 
of accruals makes use of an OLS regression using no intercept in which the total accruals are regressed against the three 
components of non-discretionary accruals. The residuals in this regression are the discretionary portion of accruals.  
7 Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) performance-adjusted abnormal accruals are measured as the residuals from the 
following specification: 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1











+ 𝜃𝜃4𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡; where 𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 represents total 
accrual, which equals to the difference between net income and operation cash flows; 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 is total assets from balance sheets; 
Δ𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 is the change in revenues from the prior year to the current year; Δ𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 is the change in accounts receivable from the 
prior year to the current year; 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅 is net property, plant, and equipment on the balance sheet; 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 is return on assets, 
measured as net income divided by lagged assets. 
8 The absolute value of discretionary accruals is commonly used in the literature. See, for example, Bartov, Gul and Tsui 
(2000). 
9 To ensure that outliers not affect the conclusions we draw, we winsorize all variables at 1 and 99 percent. 
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among others and exclude stock prices less than $2 in our study. SIZE represents the market 
capitalization. B/M is the book to market ratio is calculated by using the book value of total equity 
divided by the market capitalization of the firm scaled up by 1,000. MOMENTUM represents the 
cumulative return for each stock for the period t-2 through t-12, where t is the current year. SPREAD is 
the difference between the daily ask and bid price scaled by the spread midpoint and averaged across 
the year. TURNOVER is the daily stock trading volume scaled by the number of shares outstanding 
averaged over the year. VOLATILITY represents the standard deviation of daily returns for each stock 
across the year. ILLIQUIDITY represents the average of each stock’s daily illiquidity calculated using 
Amihud’s (2002) methodology.4  
The data on auditing characteristics is obtained from the Audit Analytics database. BIG4 is an 
indicator variable that equals one if a firm is audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms during the year.5 
AUDITFEES are the necessary fees to perform the audit or review in accordance with the General 
Accepted Auditing Standards. Data from COMPUSTAT is used to calculate the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals by using the modified Jones’ model, D_ACCRUALS_DSS, and Kothari, Leone, and 
Wasley (2005)’s performance-matched discretionary accrual measure, D_ACCRUALS_KLW.6,7 We used 
the absolute value of discretionary accruals because of concerns with the magnitude of earning 
management, regardless of the direction (positive or negative earning management).8 We also 
calculate the MSCORE following Beneish (1999) and Beneish et al. (2013) to measure the degree of 
earnings manipulation carried out by the firms. 
Table 1 presents statistics that summarize the data. Our sample period ranges from 2001 through 
2016. At the beginning of 2001, U.S. exchanges reduced the minimum tick-size from 1/16th of a dollar 
to decimals ($.01). Given that this regime change directly affects our definition of round prices 
(increments of $.05), we start our sample period in 2001. Panel A shows the accounting-related 
summary statistics. We find that on average about 68% of firms use a BIG4 auditor. Furthermore, the 
sample mean of ABSOLUTE ABNORMAL FEES is 0.399, POSITIVE ABNORMAL FEES is 0.396, and NEGATIVE 
ABNORMAL FEES is -0.413. In terms of earnings management and manipulation measures, the average 
of D_ACCRUALS_DSS is 0.108, D_ACCRUALS_KLW is 0.152, and MSCORE is -2.37.9 Panel B presents the 
summary statistics of stock-related characteristics. We aggregate this information to the annual level 
for the 2001–2016 period.  We find that firm prices close on round increments of $.05 about 76.5 days 
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10 If prices are indeed uniformly distributed across pricing increments randomly, prices should then close on round 
increments 20% of days, given that 20% of the pricing increments are considered “round”. Finding that prices close on round 
increments on 30.1% of days rejects the notion prices are uniformly distributed. Unreported tests show that the difference 
between 30.1% and 20% is reliably significant at the .01 level. 
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per year or 30.1% of days.10 This result supports the broad literature suggesting that prices 
disproportionately tend to cluster on round increments of $0.05. In a market without clustering, prices 
should be uniformly distributed across all pricing increments and therefore, CLUSTER% should be equal 
to 20%. However, we find that CLUSTER% is over 30% for the average stock in our sample. We also find 
that the average firm has a share price (PRICE) of $26.382, market capitalization (SIZE) of $13.357, B/M 
of 0.635, MOMENTUM of 0.119, a SPREAD of 0.7%, TURNOVER of 0.9%, VOLATILITY of 0.031, and 







































Table 1. Summary Statistics 
This table provides statistics that describe the sample used throughout the analysis. Panel A shows the summary 
statistics for various Accounting characteristics of the sample firms. Panel B presents the stock level summary 
statistics. BIG4 is an indicator variable that takes on value of one for a firm that has obtained auditing services 
during that year from one of the four largest professional service networks in the world, namely Deloitte, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & Young and KPMG zero otherwise ABSOLUTE ABNORMAL FEES are the absolute 
value of the residual of normal audit fee determination model. POSITIVE ABNORMAL FEES are the positive residual 
of normal audit fee determination model. NEGATIVE ABNORMAL FEES are the negative residual of the normal 
audit fee determination model. D_ACCRUALS_DSS is the abnormal discretionary accruals measure calculated 
following Dechow et al. (1995). D_ACCRUALS_KLW is the abnormal discretionary accruals measure calculated 
following Kothari et al. (2005). M-SCORE is a measure of earning manipulation. It is calculated by using various 
accounting measures following the method of Beneish (1999). CLUSTER% is the total number Cluster Days, 
divided by the total number of days traded in that year, where cluster Days is the total number of days the daily 
closing stock prices clustered on $0.05. PRICE is the closing price for each stock at the end of each year. LNSIZE is 
the natural log of the market capitalization for each stock on the last trading day of the year. B/M is book value 
divided market capitalization for each firm scaled up by 1,000. MOMENTUM represents the cumulative returns of 
each stock from period of t-12 to t-2. SPREAD the relative (percent) bid-ask spread that is calculated as the 
difference between the ask price and the bid price scaled by the spread midpoint for each stock each day 
averaged over the year. TURN is the ratio of total trading volume scaled by the shares outstanding for each stock 
each day averaged over the year. VOLATILITY represents the standard deviation of return for each stock over the 
year. ILLIQUIDITY represents the yearly average of each stock daily illiquidity calculated using Amihud (2002) 
method, which is ratio of absolute stock return to its dollar volume and scaled up by 1,000,000. 





Panel A. Accounting Characteristics 












-0.413 0.400 -0.560 -0.308 -0.138 
D_ACCRUALS_D
SS 0.171 0.448 0.032 0.074 0.158 
D_ACCRUALS_K
LW 0.152 0.387 0.027 0.066 0.145 
MSCORE -2.360 1.706 -2.838 -2.378 -1.893 
Panel B. Stock Characteristics 
CLUSTER% 0.301 0.109 0.226 0.266 0.347 
PRICE 26.382 42.740 7.560 17.155 33.950 
SIZE 13.357 1.936 12.024 13.253 14.594 
B/M 0.635 3.146 0.245 0.468 0.813 
MOMENTUM 0.119 0.762 -0.246 0.030 0.315 
SPREAD 0.007 0.013 0.001 0.002 0.008 
TURN 0.009 0.010 0.003 0.007 0.012 
VOLATILITY 0.031 0.015 0.020 0.028 0.038 
ILLIQUIDITY 1.094 9.786 0.001 0.006 0.062 




The correlation matrix in Table 2 points to the fact that CLUSTER% and BIG4 auditors are negatively 
related, while the correlations between CLUSTER% and both DISCRETIONARY ACCRUALS and MSCORE 
are positive. These correlations are consistent with our proposed hypothesis. The ABSOLUTE 
ABNORMAL FEES and POSITIVE ABNORMAL AUDIT FEES are positively related to the CLUSTER%, while 
NEGATIVE ABNORMAL FEES are negatively associated with the CLUSTER%. These correlations are also 
consistent with our expectations. 
 
Table 2. Correlation Matrix 
This table reports Pearson Correlation coefficients for the variables used throughout the analysis. 














    
[2] BIG4 -0.126 1.000       
[3] ABSOLUTE ABNORMAL FEES 0.056 -0.131 1.000      
[4] POSITIVE ABNORMAL FEES 0.015 -0.133 0.999 1.000     
[5] NEGATIVE ABNORMAL FEES -0.089 0.138 -0.989 0.000 1.000    
[6] D_ACCRUALS_DSS 0.036 -0.191 0.069 0.091 -0.050 1.000   
[7] D_ACCRUALS_KLW 0.007 -0.188 0.060 0.081 -0.039 0.886 1.000  
[8] MSCORE 0.022 0.000 -0.005 -0.017 -0.008 -0.025 -0.013 1.000 
[9] PRICE -0.036 0.146 -0.036 -0.085 0.017 -0.055 -0.059 0.011 
[10] SIZE -0.378 0.423 -0.073 -0.051 0.097 -0.112 -0.098 0.008 
[11] B/M 0.057 -0.004 -0.001 -0.011 -0.018 -0.038 -0.043 0.023 
[12] MOMENTUM 0.031 0.000 -0.016 -0.031 0.001 0.013 0.015 0.104 
[13] SPREAD 0.460 -0.291 0.050 -0.001 -0.089 0.053 0.037 -0.024 
[14] TURN -0.240 0.110 -0.012 0.005 0.022 0.070 0.068 0.048 
[15] VOLATILITY 0.140 -0.155 0.039 0.045 -0.038 0.202 0.182 0.005 
[16] ILLIQUIDITY 0.050 -0.123 0.022 -0.003 -0.039 0.008 -0.004 -0.010 
  [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] 
[9] PRICE 1.000        
[10] SIZE 0.421 1.000       
[11] B/M -0.045 -0.136 1.000      
[12] MOMENTUM 0.085 0.063 -0.032 1.000     
[13] SPREAD -0.172 -0.555 0.222 -0.009 1.000    
[14] TURN 0.037 0.198 -0.078 0.058 -0.253 1.000   
[15] VOLATILITY -0.277 -0.439 0.035 -0.018 0.374 0.278 1.000  
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11 While Harris (1991) and Chiao and Wang (2009) find a positive association between volatility and price clustering, Baig and 
Sabah (2019) and Blau (2019) use more recent data and find a negative, contemporaneous relationship between volatility 





PRICE CLUSTERING AND BIG4 AUDITORS 
 
In this section, we test our hypothesis that high audit quality is associated with lower levels of stock 
price clustering. Here, we use the definition of reputable auditors identified in the literature as the 
proxy for high auditing quality (i.e., the BIG4 audit firms). We begin by testing whether BIG4 auditors 
have an impact on the level price clustering. We estimate the following equation using the firm-year 
observations: 
 
𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅%𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵4𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿�𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽3𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿�𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽4 𝐵𝐵 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽5𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
+ 𝛽𝛽6𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  (1) 
 
We note that all of our regression specifications include year fixed effects and robust standard 
errors that are clustered at the firm level. Table 3 shows that price clustering CLUSTER% is inversely 
related to firms that have BIG4 auditors after controlling for the relevant variables. We observe a 
significant negative relation between CLUSTER% and BIG4 both in the baseline model as well as in the 
full specification. Additionally, CLUSTER% is negatively associated with market capitalization, book to 
market ratio, TURNOVER, VOLATILITY, and ILLIQUIDITY. We also find that price clustering is positively 
associated with prices, MOMENTUM, and the bid-ask spread.11 The control variables included in 
equation (1) can be categorized as the size and value of stocks (SIZE, PRICE, and B/M), the liquidity and 
stability of stocks (TURNOVER, SPREAD, ILLIQUIDITY, and VOLATILITY), and the past performance of 
stocks (MOMENTUM). Combinations of these variables have been used in a number of other studies 
that examine price clustering (Harris, 1991; Ikenberry and Weston, 2009; Chiao and Wang, 2009; 
Bradley et al., 2004; Hameed and Terry, 1998; Ni et al., 2005; Baig and Sabah, 2019; Blau, 2019; among 
others). Columns [1] and [2] show the OLS regression results. In Column [2], the coefficient of 
independent variable, BIG4, is -0.009 (significant at the .01 level). Not only is the negative relation of 
the estimate statistically significant, the estimate is also economically meaningful. It shows that stock 
prices of firms with BIG4 auditors have, on average, lower (about 1%) price clustering. Consistent with 
our hypothesis, these results indicate that firms with highly reputable auditors in turn have better 
accounting information quality, which results in less price clustering. Columns [3] and [4] represent 
the two-tailed Tobit regression results, which accounts for censoring of the dependent variable. Our 
OLS results are robust to the Tobit specification, as the results remain relatively unchanged. In sum, 
the findings from this table support our hypothesis that higher accounting information quality is 













Table 3. Price Clustering and Big 4 Auditors 
This table reports the results from estimating the following equation. We use both OLS and TOBIT (censored) 
regression specifications. 
 
 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅%𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵4𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿�𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽3𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿�𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽4 𝐵𝐵 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽5𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
+ 𝛽𝛽6𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
 
The dependent variable CLUSTER% is the total number of daily stock closing prices that clustered on $0.05 divided 
by the total number of days traded in that year. As independent variable, BIG4 is an indicator variable that takes 
on value of one for a firm that has obtain auditing services during that year from one of the four largest 
accounting firms, zero otherwise. For the definitions of control variables please refer to table 1. Corresponding 
robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and the 0.01 levels, respectively. 
CLUSTER%i,t 
 OLS REGRESSIONS CENSORED REGRESSIONS 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
INTERCEPT 0.336*** 0.531*** 0.496*** 0.679*** (138.32) (41.09) (151.85) (46.10) 
BIG4 -0.045*** -0.009*** -0.045*** -0.009*** (-18.04) (-4.44) (-18.04) (-4.44) 
LNPRICE  0.025***  0.025***  (11.20)  (11.21) 
LNSIZE  -0.020***  -0.020***  (-19.90)  (-19.91) 
B/M  -0.001*  -0.001*  (-1.93)  (-1.93) 
MOMENTUM  0.008***  0.008***  (8.17)  (8.17) 
SPREAD  1.966***  1.966***  (10.16)  (10.16) 
TURNOVER  -0.574***  -0.574***  (-5.73)  (-5.73) 
VOLATILITY  -1.042***  -1.042***  (-12.12)  (-12.13) 
ILLIQUIDITY  -0.001***  -0.001***  (-5.73)  (-5.73) 
Num of Obs 30152 28071 30152 28071 
Adj. R2/Pseudo R2 0.501 0.631 -0.436 -0.627 
Year Fixed Ef YES YES YES YES 










PRICE CLUSTERING AND CHANGES IN AUDITOR QUALITY 
 
We extend our analysis by testing the relation between price clustering and firm-level auditor change 
events. We split auditor change events into two categories. The first category is the “change from 
BIG4 to Non-BIG4” (∆ 𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵4) − zero otherwise. By examining auditor change events, we can 
provide additional evidence for the results observed in the last table and potentially identify the 
direction of the price-clustering reaction to potential auditing quality change. To do so, we begin by 
estimating the following OLS equations using our firm-year observations: 
 
𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅%𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1∆𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵4𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿�𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽3𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿�𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽4 𝐵𝐵 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽5𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡
+ 𝛽𝛽6𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  (2) 
 
𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅%𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1∆𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵4𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿�𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽3𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿�𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽4 𝐵𝐵 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽5𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
+ 𝛽𝛽6𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  (3) 
 
The dependent and independent variables in these models are the same as those in the previous 
regression specification with one exception. Instead of the BIG4 indicator as the independent variable 
of interest, we use an indicator variable ∆𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵4 (the indicator variable takes a value of one for 
a firm that switches from a BIG4 auditor to a non-BIG4 auditor during that year and zero for firms that 
continue to remain with a BIG4 auditor). Similarly, we use an indicator variable ∆𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵4 (the 
indicator variable takes a value of one for a firm that switches from a non-BIG4 auditor to BIG4 auditor 
during that year and zero for those firms that remain with non-BIG4 auditors). ∆𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵4 
essentially represents a decrease in audit quality, which would essentially signal a potential decrease 
in accounting information quality. Conversely, ∆𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵4 represents an increased auditing quality, 
which essentially signals the improved accounting information quality. 
Table 4 explores the relation between a decrease in firm-level auditing quality (∆𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵4) and 
stock-level price clustering. Columns [1] and [2] in Table 4 represent the results for the two OLS 
specifications in which we use ∆𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵4 as the independent variable of interest. In Column [2], 
the coefficient on ∆𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵4 is 0.010 (t-statistic = 2.39). The estimate is both statistically significant 
and economically meaningful. Essentially, firms that (during a year) change from a Big 4 to a lower-tier 
audit firm experience an increase in relative price clustering of about 1%. Consistent with our 
hypothesis, this result indicates that a decrease in firm-level audit quality reduces the quality of 
accounting information, which in turn triggers an increase in price clustering. The results are robust to 
















Table 4. Price Clustering and Changes in Auditor Quality 
This table reports the results from estimating the following equation. We use both OLS and TOBIT (censored) 
regression specifications. 
 
𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅%𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1∆𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵4𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿�𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽3𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿�𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽4 𝐵𝐵 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽5𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡
+ 𝛽𝛽6𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  
 
The dependent variable CLUSTER% is the total number of daily stock closing prices that clustered on $0.05 divided 
by the total number of days traded in that year. As independent variable, ∆𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵4 is an indicator variable 
that takes on value of one for a firm that changes from a Big4 auditor to a non-Big4 audit firm in that year, zero 
for benchmark firms that continue to remain with a BIG4 auditor. For the definitions of control variables please 
refer to table 1. Corresponding robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and the 0.01 levels, respectively. 
CLUSTER%i,t 
 OLS REGRESSIONS CENSORED REGRESSIONS 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
INTERCEPT 0.291*** 0.495*** 0.455*** 0.640*** (290.13) (32.98) (149.43) (35.25) 
∆ FROM BIG4 0.038*** 0.010*** 0.038*** 0.010*** (8.56) (2.39) (8.56) (2.39) 
LNPRICE  0.024***  0.024***  (8.91)  (8.91) 
LNSIZE  -0.018***  -0.018***  (-16.85)  (-16.86) 
B/M  -0.001  -0.001  (-1.40)  (-1.40) 
MOMENTUM  0.007***  0.007***  (6.13)  (6.13) 
SPREAD  2.225***  2.225***  (6.86)  (6.86) 
TURNOVER  -0.677***  -0.677***  (-5.77)  (-5.77) 
VOLATILITY  -0.955***  -0.955***  (-9.42)  (-9.43) 
ILLIQUIDITY  -0.001***  -0.001***  (-2.83)  (-2.83) 
Num of Obs 23594 21849 23954 21849 
Adj. R2/Pseudo R2 0.519 0.643 -0.431 -0.609 
Year Fixed Ef YES YES YES YES 
Robust SEs YES YES YES YES 
 
 




In contrast, Table 5 reports the relation between a firm-level increase in auditing quality (ΔTo BIG4) 
and price clustering. In columns [1] and [3], when only including the independent variable of interest, 
we find significantly negative coefficients suggesting that changing from a non-BIG4 auditor to a BIG4 
auditor results in a significant reduction in price clustering. However, when estimating the full 
specification and including all of the control variable, the coefficient on ΔTo BIG4 becomes 
indistinguishable from zero. These results indicate only very weak evidence that changes in auditing 
quality to a higher level are associated with reduced price clustering. A comparison of Table 4 and 
Table 5 indicates that price clustering is more sensitive to a decrease in auditing quality as compared 
to an increase in the auditing quality.  
A possible explanation for this asymmetric pattern might be explained by “loss aversion” 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Here, according to our hypothesis, the asymmetric response in price 
clustering to changes in auditors suggests that reductions in auditor quality are treated differently 
than improvements in auditor quality. In these cases, price clustering increases for the former but is 




































Table 5. Price Clustering and Changes in Auditor Quality 
This table reports the results from estimating the following equation. We use both OLS and TOBIT specifications. 
 
𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅%𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1∆𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵4𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿�𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽3𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿�𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽4 𝐵𝐵 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽5𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
+ 𝛽𝛽6𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  
 
The dependent variable CLUSTER% is the total number of daily stock closing prices that clustered on $0.05 divided 
by the total number of days traded in that year. As independent variable, Δ TO BIG4 is an indicator variable that 
takes on value of one for a firm that changes from a non-Big4 auditor to a Big4 audit firm in the year, zero for 
benchmark firms that remain with non-BIG4 auditors For the definitions of control variables please refer to table 
1. Corresponding robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. *, **, *** 
denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and the 0.01 levels, respectively. 
CLUSTER%i,t 
 OLS REGRESSIONS CENSORED REGRESSIONS 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
INTERCEPT 0.337*** 0.660*** 0.486*** 0.817*** (129.39) (25.65) (91.35) (29.54) 
∆ FROM BIG4 -0.035*** 0.000 -0.035*** 0.000 (-5.62) (0.08) (-5.63) (0.08) 
LNPRICE  0.031***  0.031***  (10.47)  (10.49) 
LNSIZE  -0.031***  -0.031***  (-13.93)  (-13.95) 
B/M  -0.004***  -0.004***  (-2.59)  (-2.60) 
MOMENTUM  0.008***  0.008***  (5.19)  (5.20) 
SPREAD  1.249***  1.249***  (6.05)  (6.06) 
TURNOVER  -0.367**  -0.367**  (-2.13)  (-2.14) 
VOLATILITY  -1.139***  -1.139***  (-7.37)  (-7.38) 
ILLIQUIDITY  -0.001***  -0.001***  (-5.26)  (-5.27) 
Num of Obs 6443 6123 6443 6123 
Adj. R2/Pseudo R2 0.418 0.580 -0.394 -0.631 
Year Fixed Ef YES YES YES YES 
Robust SEs YES YES YES YES 
 
PRICE CLUSTERING AND AUDIT FEES 
 
To further strengthen our hypothesis, we extend our model to test another key proxy of audit quality 
by examining audit fees. Prior literature holds competing views about the relationship between 
abnormal audit fees and audit quality. On the one hand, researchers view abnormal audit fees as an 
indication of greater auditor efforts and, thus, abnormal audit fees are positively associated with audit




quality (Blankley et al. 2012; Higgs and Skantz 2006; Eshleman and Guo 2014). On the other hand, a 
stream of literature lends support to the argument that the level of abnormal audit fees represents 
bribes or economic rents earned by auditors suggesting an inverse relation to audit quality. In this 
study, we focus on testing the relationship between abnormal audit fees and price clustering. In doing 
so, we indirectly contribute to the debate about the relationship between audit fees and audit quality. 
We use the following equation to estimate the relation between abnormal audit fees and the stock 
price clustering: 
 
𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅%𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿�𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇 𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽2𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿�𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽3𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿�𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽4 𝐵𝐵 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�
+ 𝛽𝛽5𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
+ 𝛽𝛽9𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  (4) 
 
Table 6 reports the results from the estimation of Eq. (4) in which our main variable of interest, in 
this case, is abnormal audit fees. We use three abnormal audit fee measures (i.e., ABSOLUTE 
ABNORMAL FEES, POSITIVE ABNORMAL FEES, and NEGATIVE ABNORMAL FEES). In current study, we 
adopt the economic bonding view (Kinney and Libby 2002), we view the positive abnormal audit fees 
as quasi-rents arising from a highly profitable audit engagement. Such quasi-rents may lead the auditor 
to compromise their independence, in turn, reducing audit quality (Choi et al. 2010). Therefore, we 
expect ABSOLUTE ABNORMAL FEES and POSITIVE ABNORMAL FEES to be positively associated with price 
clustering. The negative abnormal fees suggest that the firm has a strong bargaining power (and 
hence is able to negotiate billing concessions). Such high client bargaining power may lead the auditor 
to succumb to client pressure for earnings management (Asthana and Boone 2012). Thus, the more 
NEGATIVE ABNORMAL FEES, the lower the audit quality. Since the mean value of NEGATIVE ABNORMAL 
FEES is negative, we expect NEGATIVE ABNORMAL FEES to be negatively associated with price 
clustering. Consistent with our hypothesis, the coefficients of ABSOLUTE ABNORMAL FEES in Columns 
[1] and [4] are positive and significant (coefficient = 0.008, p < 0.05). Similarly, the coefficients of 
POSITIVE ABNORMAL FEES in Columns [2] and [5] are positive and significant (coefficient = 0.007, p < 
0.01). While the coefficients of NEGATIVE ABNORMAL FEES in Columns [3] and [6] are negative and 
significant (coefficient = -0.007, p < 0.1). In sum, our results seem to suggest that audit quality is directly 




















Table 6. Price Clustering and Audit Fees 
This table reports the results from estimating the following equation. We use both OLS and TOBIT (censored) 
regression specifications. 
 
𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅%𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿�𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇 𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽2𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿�𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽3𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿�𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽4 𝐵𝐵 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�
+ 𝛽𝛽5𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
+ 𝛽𝛽9𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  
 
The dependent variable CLUSTER% is the total number of daily stock closing prices that clustered on $0.05 divided 
by the total number of days traded in that year. As independent variables, ABSOLUTE ABNORMAL FEES are the 
absolute value of the residual of normal audit fee determination model. POSITIVE ABNORMAL FEES are the 
positive residual of normal audit fee determination model. NEGATIVE ABNORMAL FEES are the negative residual 
of the normal audit fee determination model. For the definitions of control variables please refer to table 1. 
Corresponding robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. *, **, *** denote 
statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and the 0.01 levels, respectively. 
CLUSTER%i,t 
 OLS REGRESSIONS CENSORED REGRESSIONS 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
INTERCEPT 0.395*** 0.381*** 0.406*** 0.395*** 0.381*** 0.406*** (30.57) (37.99) (21.61) (30.57) (38.01) (21.63) 
ABSOLUTE ABNORMAL 
FEES 
0.008**   0.008**   
(2.40)   (2.40)   
POSITIVE ABNORMAL 
FEES 
 0.007***   0.007***  
 (2.94)   (2.94)  
NEGATIVE ABNORMAL 
FEES 
  -0.007*   -0.007* 
  (-1.85)   (-1.85) 
LNPRICE 0.018*** 0.014*** 0.021*** 0.018*** 0.014*** 0.021*** (7.82) (10.49) (5.21) (7.82) (10.50) (5.21) 
LNSIZE -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.015*** (-13.94) (-15.09) (-9.81) (-13.95) (-15.09) (-9.82) 
B/M -0.002** -0.002 -0.002** -0.002** -0.002 -0.002** (-2.22) (-1.21) (-2.18) (-2.22) (-1.21) (-2.18) 
MOMENTUM 0.002 0.002* 0.001 0.002 0.002* 0.001 (1.50) (1.85) (0.63) (1.50) (1.85) (0.63) 
SPREAD 2.195*** 2.570*** 1.900*** 2.195*** 2.570*** 1.900*** (7.18) (8.37) (5.31) (7.18) (8.37) (5.31) 
TURNOVER -0.523*** -0.575*** -0.487*** -0.523*** -0.575*** -0.487*** (-5.34) (-5.65) (-3.72) (-5.34) (-5.65) (-3.72) 
VOLATILITY -0.344*** -0.391*** -0.292** -0.344*** -0.391*** -0.292** (-5.13) (-5.46) (-2.38) (-5.13) (-5.46) (-2.38) 
ILLIQUIDITY -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** (-5.55) (-6.65) (-3.36) (-5.55) (-6.65) (-3.36) 
BIG4 0.003 -0.007*** -0.003 0.003 -0.007*** -0.003 (1.43) (-3.5) (-0.80) (1.43) (-3.5) (-0.80) 
Num of Obs 19213 10136 9077 19213 10136 9077 
Adj. R2/Pseudo R2 0.222 0.232 0.218 -0.095 -0.095 -0.099 
Year Fixed Ef YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust SEs YES YES YES YES YES YES 




PRICE CLUSTERING AND CHANGES IN AUDIT FEES 
 
In the previous table we used the level of abnormal audit fees as an explanatory variable. Here, we 
look at the relationship between changes in the abnormal audit fee and the level of price clustering. A 
positive change in ABSOLUTE ABNORMAL FEES coincides with an increase in deviation of normal audit 
fees. Hence, a higher absolute abnormal fee residual represents lower accounting information quality 
(Choi et al. 2010). Therefore, we expect a positive relation between ΔABSOLUTE ABNORMAL FEES and 
price clustering. Similarly, a positive change in POSITIVE ABNORMAL FEES captures more excessive 
rents that an auditor can charge the auditee. Therefore, we also expect a positive relationship 
between ΔPOSITIVE ABNORMAL FEES and price clustering. A negative change in NEGATIVE ABNORMAL 
FEES (i.e., become more negative) captures stronger auditees’ bargaining power, which is provided as 
evidence of lower audit quality (Asthana and Boone 2012). Therefore, we expect a negative 
relationship between ΔNEGATIVE ABNORMAL FEES and price clustering. We estimate the following 
equation: 
 
𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅%𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1∆𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿�𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽3𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿�𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽4 𝐵𝐵 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�
+ 𝛽𝛽5𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
+ 𝛽𝛽9𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  (5) 
 
The results from estimating Eq. (5) are reported in Table 7. As per our hypothesis, the coefficients 
on the ΔABSOLUTE ABNORMAL FEES in Column [1] and Column [4] are positive and significant at 5 
percent level. In Columns [2] and [5], the coefficients on the ΔPOSITIVE ABNORMAL FEES is positive 
and significant at the 0.01 level. We do not find a significant negative relationship between the change 
in negative abnormal audit fees and price clustering, nevertheless, the findings of ΔABSOLUTE 
ABNORMAL FEES and ΔPOSITIVE ABNORMAL FEES complement our earlier results and seem to confirm 
our hypothesis that a decrease in audit quality leads to a decrease in accounting information quality 























Table 7. Price Clustering and Changes in Abnormal Audit Fees 
This table reports the results from estimating the following equation. We use OLS and TOBIT (censored) 
regression specifications.  
 
𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅%𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1∆𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿�𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽3𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿�𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽4 𝐵𝐵 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�
+ 𝛽𝛽5𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
+ 𝛽𝛽9𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
 
The dependent variable CLUSTER% is the total number of daily stock closing prices that clustered on $0.05 divided 
by the total number of days traded in that year. As independent variables, Δ ABSOLUTE ABNORMAL AUDITFEES 
are the difference of the absolute value of the abnormal audit fees from period of t-1 to t. Δ POSITIVE ABNORMAL 
AUDITFEES are the difference of the positive abnormal audit fees from period of t-1 to t. Δ NEGATIVE ABNORMAL 
AUDITFEES are the difference of the negative abnormal audit fees from period of t-1 to t. For the definitions of 
control variables please refer to table 1. Corresponding robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses below 
each coefficient estimate. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and the 0.01 levels, 
respectively. 
CLUSTER%i,t 
 OLS REGRESSIONS CENSORED REGRESSIONS 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
INTERCEPT 0.359*** 0.347*** 0.362*** 0.359*** 0.347*** 0.362*** (28.93) (34.60) (18.32) (28.94) (34.62) (18.34) 
Δ ABSOLUTE ABNORMAL 
FEES 
0.003**   0.003**   
(1.96)   (1.96)   
Δ POSITIVE ABNORMAL 
FEES 
 0.008***   0.008***  
 (2.63)   (2.63)  
Δ NEGATIVE ABNORMAL 
FEES 
  -0.003   -0.003 
  (-1.34)   (-1.34) 
LNPRICE 0.016*** 0.011*** 0.021*** 0.016*** 0.011*** 0.021*** (7.11) (8.69) (4.45) (7.11) (8.69) (4.45) 
LNSIZE -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.012*** (-11.62) (-12.26) (-7.38) (-11.62) (-12.26) (-7.38) 
B/M -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 (-1.64) (-1.05) (-1.63) (-1.64) (-1.05) (-1.63) 
MOMENTUM -0.001 0.002 -0.005** -0.001 0.002 -0.005** (-0.58) (1.33) (-2.02) (-0.58) (1.33) (-2.03) 
SPREAD 2.012*** 2.248*** 1.604*** 2.012*** 2.248*** 1.604*** (6.56) (7.55) (4.32) (6.56) (7.55) (4.33) 
TURNOVER -0.540*** -0.568*** -0.721*** -0.540*** -0.568*** -0.721*** (-6.24) (-5.81) (-5.33) (-6.24) (-5.81) (-5.33) 
VOLATILITY -0.132** -0.229*** 0.102 -0.132** -0.229*** 0.102 (-2.03) (-3.30) (0.64) (-2.03) (-3.31) (0.64) 
ILLIQUIDITY -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** (-5.28) (-5.47) (-3.05) (-5.28) (-5.47) (-3.05) 
BIG4 -0.002 0.003 -0.011*** -0.002 0.003 -0.011*** (-0.92) (1.44) (-2.71) (-0.92) (1.44) (-2.71) 
Num of Obs 16162 7180 6394 16162 7180 6394 
Adj. R2/Pseudo R2 0.230 0.251 0.226 -0.092 -0.094 -0.096 
Year Fixed Ef YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust SEs YES YES YES YES YES YES 




PRICE CLUSTERING AND DISCRETIONARY ACCRUALS 
 
In previous sections, we have identified a robust relation between audit quality and price clustering. 
However, until this point, we have assumed that a higher audit quality can translate into better 
accounting information quality, which in turn partially explains price clustering. In this section, we look 
specifically at one of our proxies for accounting information quality: accrual earnings management. 
We use two different methods to compute discretionary accruals. First, following Dechow et al. (1995), 
we apply a modified Jones model to calculate the level of discretionary accruals (D_ACCRUALS_DSS). 
Second, we use a performance-matched discretionary accrual (D_ACCRUALS_KLW) measure following 
Kothari et al. (2005). Both measures represent aggressiveness of the firm’s accounting practices and 
provide a signal regarding earnings management. We take the absolute value of both measures since 
we are interested in the magnitude rather than the direction of earnings management. A high absolute 
value of discretionary accruals represents a high level of earnings management, which, in turn, 
translates into a higher information asymmetry and leads to increased uncertainty in financial markets. 
According to our hypothesis, this increased uncertainty induces higher information acquisition costs, 
which can cause prices to cluster more frequently on round increments. In our next set of tests, we 
estimate the following equation: 
 
𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅%𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑉𝑉 𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿�𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽3𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿�𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽4 𝐵𝐵 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�
+ 𝛽𝛽5𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡
+ 𝛽𝛽9𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  (6) 
 
Columns [1] and [3] in Table 8 report the results from the estimation of the OLS regressions (Eq. 
(6)) while Columns [5] and [7] report the results from the Tobit regressions by using D_ACCRUALS_KLW 
as the independent variable. Columns [2] and [4] report the results from the estimation of OLS 
regressions (Eq. (6)), while Columns [6] and [8] report the results from Tobit regressions by using 
D_ACCRUALS_DSS as the independent variable. When the independent variable is D_ACCRUAL_KLW in 
the baseline and the full specification (Columns [1] and [3]), the coefficients are positive and 
significant. The coefficient in Column [3] is 0.014 (p < 0.01). Likewise, when the independent variable 
is D_ACCRUALS_DSS in the baseline and full specification (Columns [2] and [4]), the coefficients are 
significantly positive. The coefficient in Column [4] is 0.017 (p< 0.01), which suggests that a one-SD 
increase in absolute discretionary accrual is associated with an increase of stock price clustering by 
about 76 basis points. These results further reaffirm our hypothesis by showing that financial reporting 
















Table 8. Price Clustering and Discretionary Accruals 
This table reports the results from estimating the following equation. We use both OLS and TOBIT (censored) 
regression specifications. 
 
𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅%𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑉𝑉 𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿�𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽3𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿�𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽4 𝐵𝐵 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�
+ 𝛽𝛽5𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡
+ 𝛽𝛽9𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  
 
The dependent variable CLUSTER% is the total number of daily stock closing prices that clustered on $0.05 divided 
by the total number of days traded in that year. As independent variables, D_ACCRUALS_DSS are the absolute 
value of discretionary accrual calculated by using modified Jones model created by Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 
(1995). D_ACCRUALS_KLW is the absolute value of discretionary accrual calculated by following Kothari et al. 
(2005). For the definitions of control variables please refer to table 1. Corresponding robust t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 
0.05, and the 0.01 levels, respectively. 
CLUSTER%i,t 
 OLS REGRESSIONS CENSORED REGRESSIONS 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
INTERCEPT 0.467*** 0.470*** 0.662*** 0.683*** 0.467*** 0.470*** 0.662*** 0.683*** (54.15) (46.29) (26.01) (28.90) (54.23) (46.35) (26.05) (28.94) 
D_ACCRUALS
_KLW 
0.016***  0.014***  0.016***  0.014***  
(4.24)  (4.38)  (4.24)  (4.39)  
D_ACCRUALS
_DSS 
 0.015***  0.017***  0.015***  0.017*** 
 (4.24)  (5.27)  (4.24)  (5.28) 
LNPRICE   0.023*** 0.025***   0.023*** 0.025***   (11.32) (11.55)   (11.34) (11.57) 
LNSIZE 
  -0.021*** -0.021***   -0.021*** -0.021*** 
  (-19.66) (-20.75)   (-19.70) (-20.78) 
B/M   -0.001** 
-0.002***   -0.001** -0.002*** 
  (-2.06) (-2.75)   (-2.06) (-2.75) 
MOMENTUM   0.007*** 
0.008***   0.007*** 0.008*** 
  (7.71) (8.33)   (7.72) (8.34) 
SPREAD   2.032*** 1.989***   2.032*** 1.989***   (9.17) (10.08)   (9.19) (10.10) 
TURNOVER   -0.512*** 
-0.558***   -0.512*** -0.558*** 
  (-5.06) (-5.27)   (-5.06) (-5.27) 
VOLATILITY   
-1.046*** -1.111***   -1.046*** -1.111*** 
  (-12.20) (-12.88)   (-12.21) (-12.90) 
ILLIQUIDITY   
-0.001*** -0.001***   -0.001*** -0.001*** 
  (-5.42) (-5.54)   (-5.42) (-5.55) 
Num of Obs 27598 29945 25683 27881 27598 29945 25683 27881 
Adj. 
R2/Pseudo R2 0.465 0.488 0.621 0.638 -0.367 -0.420 -0.572 -0.639 
Year Fixed Ef YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust SEs 
 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 




PRICE CLUSTERING AND BENEISH MSCORE 
 
Another measure of accounting information quality used in this paper is the Beneish manipulation 
score (MSCORE), which proxies for the extent of earnings manipulation. We propose that firms with a 
high MSCORE are those with very low-quality accounting information. We expect that a high level of 
MSCORE is associated with a high level of price clustering as follows: 
 
𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅%𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿�𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽3𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿�𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽4 𝐵𝐵 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽5𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
+ 𝛽𝛽6𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (7) 
 
Table 9 presents the results from the Eq. (7) estimation. Columns [1] and [2] show the results of the 
baseline and full specifications from the OLS model. All the regression specifications yield a positive 
and significant coefficient on MSCORE, which supports our hypothesis predictions. In Column, [2] the 
coefficient on MSCORE is positive (coefficient = 0.002, p < 0.01). The positive association between 




































Table 9. Price Clustering and Beneish (1999) MSCORE 
This table reports the results from estimating the following equation. We use both OLS and TOBIT (censored) 
regression specifications. 
 
𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅%𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿�𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽3𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿�𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽4 𝐵𝐵 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽5𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
+ 𝛽𝛽6𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  
 
The dependent variable CLUSTER% is the total number of daily stock closing prices that clustered on $0.05 divided 
by the total number of days traded in that year. As independent variable, MSCORE is the earnings manipulation 
score of Beneish (1999). For the definitions of control variables please refer to table 1. Corresponding robust t-
statistics are reported in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. *, **, *** denote statistical significance 
at the 0.10, 0.05, and the 0.01 levels, respectively.. 
CLUSTER%i,t 
 OLS REGRESSIONS CENSORED REGRESSIONS 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
INTERCEPT 0.304*** 0.546*** 0.469*** 0.700*** (203.90) (36.81) (148.05) (41.19) 
MSCORE 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** (4.56) (5.20) (4.56) (5.20) 
LNPRICE  0.021***  0.021***  (11.19)  (11.20) 
LNSIZE  -0.020***  -0.020***  (-19.50)  (-19.51) 
B/M 
 -0.002  -0.002 
 (-1.34)  (-1.34) 
MOMENTUM  0.008***  0.008***  (8.62)  (8.63) 
SPREAD  1.962***  1.962***  (9.65)  (9.65) 
TURNOVER  -0.476***  -0.476***  (-4.51)  (-4.51) 
VOLATILITY  -1.236***  -1.236***  (-13.12)  (-13.12) 
ILLIQUIDITY  -0.001***  -0.001***  (-5.56)  (-5.56) 
Num of Obs 24993 23209 24993 23209 
Adj. R2/Pseudo R2 0.480 0.637 -0.401 -0.623 
Year Fixed Ef YES YES YES YES 
Robust SEs 
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__________________________________________________ 
12 In a series of unreported tests, we replicate our analysis including both year- and firm fixed effects. We initially excluded 
firm-fixed effects since our indicator variable capturing Big 4 Auditors has very little variation across time for some stocks. In 
general, we find that the results reported in each of the tables hold when including firm-fixed effects. As expected, the main 
difference occurs when we include both firm fixed effects and BIG4 as the estimate on BIG4 significantly decreases. 
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PRICE CLUSTERING AND ALL ACCOUNTING VARIABLES 
 
We next attempt to investigate all the accounting and audit variables together (i.e., BIG4, ABSOLUTE 
ABNORMAL FEES, DISCRETIONARY ACCRUALS, and the MSCORE). We estimate the following 
equation using our sample of firm-year observations: 
 
𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅%𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵4𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿�𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡�
+ 𝛽𝛽3𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑉𝑉 𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿�𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽6𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿�𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡�
+ 𝛽𝛽7 𝐵𝐵 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽8𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽10𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽11𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡
+ 𝛽𝛽12𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  (8) 
 
Table 10 presents the results from the Eq. (10) estimation. All of the variables of interest have 
statistically significant coefficients and possess the correct expected signs with one exception. We do 
not find a significant estimate on abnormal audit fees. In Column [2], the coefficients obtained via the 
full-specification OLS regression show that BIG4 has a negative coefficient of -0.008 (p<0.01); 
D_ACCRUAL_DSS produces a positive coefficient of 0.022 (p < 0.01); and MSCORE also has a positive 
coefficient of 0.001 (p < 0.05). The coefficients in both Columns [2] and [4] are similar in sign and 
generally similar in magnitude to the corresponding coefficients in previous tables. In sum, these 
results indicate that firms with auditors of lower reputations, more discretionary accruals, and a higher 
MSCORE generally have stocks with more price clustering. These results support our hypothesis that 
the quality of accounting information helps explain, in part, the anomalous level of price clustering 

























Table 10. Price Clustering and All Accounting Variables 
The table reports the results from estimating the following equation. We use both OLS and TOBIT specifications. 
 
𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅%𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵4𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿�𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡�
+ 𝛽𝛽3𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑉𝑉 𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿�𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽6𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿�𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡�
+ 𝛽𝛽7 𝐵𝐵 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽8𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽10𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽11𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡
+ 𝛽𝛽12𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  
 
The dependent variable CLUSTER% is the total number of daily stock closing prices that clustered on $0.05 divided 
by the total number of days traded in that year. As independent variables, BIG4 is an indicator variable that takes 
on value of one for a firm that has obtain auditing services during that year from one of the four largest 
accounting firms, zero otherwise. LN (ABSOLUTE ABNORMAL FEES) is the natural log of are the absolute value of 
the residual of normal audit fee determination model. D_ACCRUALS_DSS are the absolute value of discretionary 
accrual calculated via Modified Jones model created by Dechow et al. (1995). MSCORE is a measure of earning 
manipulation calculated using method of Beneish (1999). For the definitions of control variables please refer to 
table 1. Corresponding robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. *, **, *** 
denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and the 0.01 levels, respectively. 
CLUSTER%i,t 
 OLS REGRESSIONS CENSORED REGRESSIONS 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
INTERCEPT 0.285*** 0.392*** 0.361*** 0.464*** (101.83) (24.61) (104.10) (29.26) 
BIG4 -0.038*** -0.008*** -0.038*** -0.008*** (-15.29) (-3.83) (-15.30) (-3.83) 
D_ACCRUALS_DSS 0.018*** 0.022*** 0.018*** 0.022*** (3.44) (4.31) (3.44) (4.31) 
ABSOLUTE 
ABNORMAL FEES 
-0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
(-0.84) (-0.67) (-0.84) (-0.67) 
MSCORE 0.000 0.001** 0.000 0.001** (1.00) (2.17) (1.00) (2.18) 
LNPRICE  0.015***  0.015***  (9.07)  (9.08) 
LNSIZE  -0.012***  -0.012***  (-12.51)  (-12.52) 
B/M  -0.001  -0.001  (-0.81)  (-0.81) 
MOMENTUM  0.005***  0.005***  (5.35)  (5.35) 
SPREAD  2.108***  2.108***  (6.58)  (6.59) 
TURNOVER  -0.476***  -0.476***  (-5.00)  (-5.01) 
VOLATILITY  -0.515***  -0.515***  (-5.24)  (-5.24) 
ILLIQUIDITY  -0.001***  -0.001***  (-4.88)  (-4.89) 
Num of Obs 17371 16075 17371 16075 
Adj. R2/Pseudo R2 0.238 0.414 -0.101 -0.198 
Year Fixed Ef YES YES YES YES 
Robust SEs YES YES YES YES 






Among the many peculiar findings in financial markets, perhaps none have broader implications than 
the tendency of stocks to cluster on round prices. Given the general role that prices play in revealing 
information to market participants (Hayek, 1945; Friedman, 1977), price clustering, which has been 
documented in commodity, bond, and equity markets, questions the informational efficiency of stock 
prices in financial markets. While much of the literature has attempted to document the presence of 
clustering, fewer studies have sought to explain the factors that determine the level of clustering. 
Harris (1991) finds support for the argument that price clustering occurs because traders are willing to 
settle on round prices to avoid the costs of further negotiations. These costs are likely a function of 
the time it takes to further negotiate as well as the costs associated with acquiring more granular 
information. Our study develops and tests the hypothesis that accounting information quality 
influences the degree of price clustering. To the extent that lower-quality accounting information 
generates uncertainty that raises the costs of acquiring new information, stocks will tend to cluster 
more on round prices. 
We conduct a series of multivariate tests in which we attempt to determine whether price 
clustering is explained by poor accounting information that we proxied with poor audit quality and 
earnings management/manipulation. Results show strong evidence that poor accounting information 
partly explains the unusual level of price clustering in financial markets. These results are both 
statistically significant and economically meaningful. Our results are also robust to a number of 
different accounting measures that capture poor audit quality and the management/manipulation of 
earnings. The findings from our study have broad implications and highlight the importance that 
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